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APPROXIMATING POWER BY WEIGHTS
SASCHA KURZ
ABSTRACT. Determining the power distribution of the members of a shareholder meet-
ing or a legislative committee is a well-known problem for many applications. In
some cases it turns out that power is nearly proportional to relative voting weights,
which is very beneficial for both theoretical considerations and practical computations
with many members. We present quantitative approximation results with precise error
bounds for several power indices as well as impossibility results for such approxima-
tions between power and weights.
1. INTRODUCTION
Consider a stock corporation whose shares are hold by three major stockholders own-
ing 35%, 34%, and 17%, respectively. The remaining 14% are widely spread. Assum-
ing that decisions are made by a simple majority rule, all three major stockholders have
equal influence on the company’s decisions, while the private shareholders have no say.
To be more precise, any two major stockholders can adopt a proposal, while the pri-
vate shareholders together with an arbitrary major stockholder need further affirmation.
Such decision environments can be captured by means of weighted voting games. For-
mally, a weighted (voting) game consists of a set of players N = {1, . . . , n}, a vector of
non-negative weights w = (w1, . . . , wn), and a positive quota q. A proposal is accepted
if and only if the weight sum of its supporters meets or exceeds the quota. Committees
that decide between two alternatives have received wide attention. Von Neumann and
Morgenstern introduced the notion of simple games, which is a super class of weighted
games, in [41]. Examples of decision-making bodies that can be modeled as weighted
games are the US Electoral College, the Council of the European Union, the UN Secu-
rity Council, the International Monetary Fund or the Governing Council of the European
Central Bank. Many applications seek to evaluate players’ influence or power in sim-
ple or weighted games, see, e.g., [28]. The initial example illustrates that shares or
weights can be a poor proxy for the distribution of power. Using the taxicab metric,
i.e., the ‖ · ‖1-distance, the corresponding distance between shares and relative power is∣∣0.35− 1
3
∣∣+ ∣∣0.34− 1
3
∣∣+ ∣∣0.17− 1
3
∣∣+ |0.14− 0| ≈32.67%.
If the weights add up to one, then we speak of relative weights. The insight that
the power distribution differs from relative weights, triggered the invention of so-called
power indices like the Shapley-Shubik index [40], the Penrose-Banzhaf index [3], or
the nucleolus [39]. Due to the combinatorial nature of most of those indices, qualita-
tive assessments are technically demanding and large numbers of involved parties cause
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2 SASCHA KURZ
computational challenges [4]. Moreover, there is a large variety of different power in-
dices proposed so far. On the positive side, there are a few limit results, which state
that, under certain technical conditions, the power distribution of an infinite sequence
of weighted voting systems tends to the relative weight distribution. This of course
simplifies the analysis. The aim of this paper is to provide quantitative results of the
form
‖p− w‖1 =
n∑
i=1
|pi − wi| ≤ c∆
min{q, 1− q} , (1)
where w is the relative weight vector, q the quota, p the power distribution induced
by a certain power index, ∆ = maxiwi the maximum relative weight, and c ∈ R>0
a constant depending on the chosen power index. This inequality provides a concrete
error bound based on just a few invariants of the underlying weighted game. Although
limit results for sequences of weighted games can be derived in general, Inequality (1)
can also be applied to a single weighted game. Applications range from approximating
power distributions with many involved parties, where the exact evaluation is computa-
tionally infeasible, to statements about power distributions in situations with incomplete
or uncertain information. In our above example there may be many private shareholders
whose exact shares are either unknown (due to the lack of a reporting obligation) or
highly volatile. (Our precise statement about the exact power distribution, independent
of the distribution of the widely spread shareholdings and almost independent of the
chosen power index, is due to a rather special situation, see the end of Subsection 2.1.)
Results for different distance measures can be derived in a unified way, which makes
the choice of the ‖ · ‖1-distance less special. The precise involvement of the invariants
∆, q, and 1 − q in the right hand side of Inequality (1) is rather an explanation of a
universal behavior than a limitation. We will derive lower bounds for the constant c in-
dependent of the properties of the chosen power index, i.e., besides the constant, results
like Inequality (1) are the best we can hope for. This explains the necessity of several
conditions used in known limit results.
For the Shapley-Shubik index Neyman obtained in 1982:
Theorem 1.1. [35] Let n ∈ N, N = {1, . . . , n}, 0 < q < 1, w ∈ Rn≥0 with ‖w‖1 = 1,
and P (i, q) be the probability that in a random order of N , i is the first element in
the order for which the w-accumulated sum exceeds q. For every ε > 0 there exist
constants δ > 0 and K > 0 such that if ρ = maxi∈N wi < δ, and Kρ < q < 1 −Kρ
then ‖P (·, q)− w‖1 < ε.
In other words, if the maximum relative weight ∆ approaches zero and the relative
quota q is not too near to the extreme points 0 or 1, then the power distribution tends to
the vector of relative weights if the distance is measured by the ‖ · ‖1-norm. The precise
dependence of δ and K on ε is hidden in the technical lemmas of [35]. This is due to
the fact that the original motivation behind this result was the study of the asymptotic
value of non-atomic games.
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Another well-known limit theorem is the Penrose limit theorem (PLT). It is an un-
proven statement implicitly contained in [38]. Loosely speaking it states that, for a
quota of one half, under certain conditions, the ratio between the Penrose-Banzhaf in-
dices of any two voters converges to the ratio between their weights as the number of
voters increases and the maximum relative weight decreases to zero. In [32] the authors
used Theorem 1.1 in order to derive a version of the PLT for the Shapley-Shubik in-
dex for so-called replicative q-chains, where finitely many types of voters get replicated
with a strictly positive frequency. In Lemma 4.1 we deduce a general PLT-type result
from Inequality (1), cf. [25, Proposition 1]. Using a local central limit theorem (for
normalized sums of independent random variables) Lindner and Machover, see [32],
also obtained a PLT for the Penrose-Banzhaf index for q = 1
2
∑n
i=1wi and divisibility
conditions on the involved (non-normalized) integer weights.
Besides the Shapley-Shubik and the Penrose-Banzhaf index, further limit results have
only been obtained for the nucleolus. In [25, Lemma 1] the authors have proven Inequal-
ity (1) for c = 2, which implies a PLT-type result.
One important problem in the context of power indices and weighted games, is the
so-called “inverse power index problem”, see e.g. [7, 19, 23, 24] and the references
therein. It asks for weights and a quota such that the corresponding power distribution
meets a given ideal power distribution as closely as possible. Since there is only a finite
number of different weighted or simple games, it is obvious that some power vectors
can not be approximated too closely if the number of voters is small. In [1] Alon and
Edelman showed that there are also vectors that are hard to approximate by the Penrose-
Banzhaf index of a simple game if most of the mass of the vector is concentrated on a
small number of coordinates. This goes in line with a relatively large maximum weight
∆. Generalizations and impossibility results for other power indices have been obtained
in [22].
The case where the power distribution coincidentally matches relative weights has
received special attention in the literature. For the Penrose-Banzhaf index, the subclass
of spherically separable simple games has this property, see [14]. In [37] Peleg shows
that a homogeneous constant-sum weighted game has a nucleolus which equals the
relative homogeneous weights. A similar result for the nucleolus of weighted games
with many replicated voters that have integral weights from a finite set has been obtained
in [25, Proposition 2].
For more practically orientated studies on the ownership and control structure of stock
companies we refer the interested reader, e.g., to [31]. Algorithms to approximate power
indices can, e.g., be found in [2, 9, 29]. The expected difference between power and
weights has been studied in [15] for the Shapley-Shubik and the Penrose-Banzhaf index.
Intervals for the power of voters in weighted games with uncertain weights can also
be computed with integer linear programming techniques, see [21]. However, these
techniques (currently) are computationally infeasible for more than, say, 20 voters.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce weighted
games, power indices, norms and limits. Our main results are concluded in Section 3,
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which is subdivided into three subsections. First we discuss invariants of weighted
games that are suitable for upper bounds on the deviation of power and relative weights.
Proposition 3.8 shows that the relative quota, the number of voters, or the maximum
relative weight alone are impractical for this purpose. In Theorem 3.17 we argue that
bounds of the form of Inequality (1) are the best that we can hope for (in a certain
restricted sense). One such upper bound, which is applicable for the nucleolus, is ob-
tained in Lemma 3.9. A more general result applicable to a larger class of power indices
is presented in Theorem 3.15. We close this section by numerical investigations for
other power indices from the literature that are not captured by the mentioned theorem.
In Section 4 we briefly show how quotient-like statements as PLT-type results can be
obtained in general from those ‖ · ‖1 upper bounds. We close with a conclusion and
future research directions in Section 5. The more technical proofs from the results of
Section 3 are moved to Section A in the appendix.
2. PRELIMINARIES
This section collects some notation and basic facts. Simple games, weighted games
and power indices as a tool for the measurement of voting power are treated in Subsec-
tion 2.1. Subsection 2.2 treats the mathematical basics of distance functions, norms, and
limits.
2.1. Weighted games, simple games and measurement of power. For a positive
integer n let N = {1, . . . , n} be the set of voters. A simple game is a mapping
v : 2N → {0, 1} from the subsets of N to binary outcomes satisfying v(∅) = 0,
v(N) = 1, and v(S) ≤ v(T ) for all ∅ ⊆ S ⊆ T ⊆ N . The interpretation in the
context of binary voting systems is as follows. A subset S ⊆ N is considered as the set
of voters that are in favor of a proposal, i.e., which vote “yes”. v(S) encodes the group
decision, i.e., v(S) = 1 if the proposal is accepted and v(S) = 0 otherwise. So, these
assumptions are quite natural for a voting system with binary options in the input and
output domain. A simple game v is called weighted if there exist weights w ∈ Rn≥0 and
a quota q ∈ R>0 such that v(S) = 1 if and only if w(S) :=
∑
i∈S wi ≥ q.1 From the
conditions of a simple game we conclude 0 < q ≤ w(N). If w(N) = 1 we speak of
normalized or relative weights, where 0 < q ≤ 1. We denote the respective game by
v = [q;w] and refer to the pair (q;w) as a weighted representation, i.e., we can have
[q;w] = [q′;w′] but (q;w) 6= (q′;w′). The example from the introduction can, e.g., be
represented by (51%; 35%, 34%, 17%, 14%),
(
1
2
; 1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
, 0
)
, or (6; 4, 3, 3, 1), where the
fourth voter mimics the private shareholders. Two voters i, j ∈ N are called equivalent
if v(S ∪{i}) = v(S ∪{j}) for all S ⊆ N\{i, j}. If v({i}) = 1, we call voter i a passer
and a null voter if v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S) for all S ⊆ N\{i}.
A power index ϕ is a family of mappings from the set of simple or weighted games
on n voters into Rn, where ϕi(v) denotes the ith component of ϕ(v) ∈ Rn. We call ϕ
positive if ϕ(v) ∈ Rn≥0\{0} for all possible games v. We say that ϕ satisfies the null
1Some authors require w(S) > q, which may be written as w(S) ≥ q′ for q′ slightly larger than q.
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voter property if ϕi(v) = 0 for each null voter i ∈ N . We call ϕ symmetric if ϕi(v) =
ϕj(v) for all equivalent voters i, j and efficient if ‖ϕ(v)‖1 = 1 for all possible games
v. However, if ϕ is not efficient but positive, then ϕ′i(v) := ϕi(v)/
∑n
j=1 ϕj(v) is both.
The absolute Penrose-Banzhaf index is defined by 1
2n−1
∑
S⊆N\{i} (v(S ∪ {i})− v(S))
for voter i ∈ N . With this, the (relative) Penrose-Banzhaf index is the corresponding
efficient version as constructed before. The Shapley-Shubik index for voter i is given
by
∑
S⊆N\{i}
|S|!·(n−|S|−1)!
n!
· (v(S ∪ {i})− v(S)). In order to define the nucleolus of a
simple game we need some preparations. In our context, an imputation x is an element
of Rn≥0 with ‖x‖1 ≤ 1. For an imputation x and S ⊆ N we call e(S, x) = v(S) −
x(S) the excess, where x(S) =
∑
i∈S xi. With this, the excess vector is the weakly
monotonically decreasing list of the excesses of the 2n subsets of N . E.g., for v =
[4; 3, 2, 1, 1] and x =
(
1
3
, 1
3
, 1
6
, 1
3
)
the excess vector is given by(
1
2
, 1
2
, 1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
, 1
6
, 1
6
, 0, 0,−1
6
,−1
6
,−1
3
,−1
3
,−1
3
,−1
2
,−1
2
)
.
The (unique) imputation x? that yields the lexicographical minimal excess vector is
called the nucleolus of v. See [39] for the original definition which does not apply to
simple games with more than one passer. ‖x?‖1 = 1 is automatically satisfied by the
excess minimizer. Note that some authors require ‖x‖1 = 1 for any imputation. We
remark that all three mentioned power indices are positive, symmetric, efficient and
satisfy the null voter property.
In order to describe the structure underlying the example from the introduction, we
have to introduce an unanimity game uS as follows: uS(T ) = 1 if and only if S ⊆ T ,
where ∅ 6= S ⊆ N . For each symmetric and efficient power index ϕ satisfying the null
voter property we have ϕi(uS) = 1/|S| for all i ∈ S and ϕi(uS) = 0 otherwise.
2.2. Mathematical basics of limits, norms and distance functions. A distance func-
tion or metric is used to measure the distance between two elements x, y of some (ar-
bitrary) set U . For a metric we assume no structure of the set U , which in turn allows
a vast diversity of different metrics in general. Given a metric d on a set U we can
compare any two elements of U according to their distance. For a sequence (xn)n∈N,
i.e., an infinite ordered list of elements xn ∈ U , in U , we can formalize the idea of the
xn tending to some ultimate x ∈ U as follows:
Definition 2.1. Given a metric space (U, d), i.e., a set U and a metric d on U , we say
that x ∈ U is the limit of a sequence (xn)n∈N (in U ) if for all ε ∈ R>0 there exists an
N(ε) ≥ 0 such that for all integers n ≥ N(ε), we have d(xn, x) < ε. If a sequence
admits a limit, we say that the sequence is convergent.
We remark that each convergent sequence uniquely determines a limit. However,
whether a sequence converges can depend on the used metric. We thus restrict attention
to metrics induced by a norm of a finite dimensional vector space. Each norm ‖ · ‖
induces a distance function via d(x, y) := ‖x − y‖. For V = Rn examples of norms
are given by ‖x‖1 =
∑n
i=1 |xi| and ‖x‖∞ = max1≤i≤n |xi|. Given a vector space V
two metrics ‖ · ‖ and ‖ · ‖′ are called equivalent if there exist l1, l2, u1, u2 ∈ R>0 such
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that l1‖v‖ ≤ ‖v‖′ ≤ u1‖v‖ and l2‖v‖′ ≤ ‖v‖ ≤ u2‖v‖′ for all v ∈ V . In a finite-
dimensional vector space all norms are equivalent. As an example consider
1 · ‖x‖∞ ≤ ‖x‖1 ≤ n · ‖x‖∞ and 1
n
· ‖x‖1 ≤ ‖x‖∞ ≤ 1 · ‖x‖1
for all n ∈ N>0 and all x ∈ Rn =: V . (Indeed the stated constants are tight as they are
attained at x = (1, 0, . . . , 0) and x = (1, . . . , 1).) So, in Rn a sequence is convergent
with respect to a metric induced by norm ‖ · ‖ if and only if it is convergent with respect
to a metric induced by another norm ‖ · ‖′, i.e., there is no need to explicitly state the
used norm. (As long as the application does not call for a specific metric that is not
induced by a norm or the dimension n of the ambient space is varying too.)
The bound ‖x‖∞ ≤ ‖x‖1 can be slightly improved in our context.
Lemma 2.2. Forw,w ∈ Rn≥0 with ‖w‖1 = ‖w‖1 = 1, we have ‖w−w‖∞ ≤ 12‖w−w‖1.
PROOF. With S := {1 ≤ i ≤ n | wi ≤ wi} and A :=
∑
i∈S (wi − wi), B :=∑
i∈N\S (wi − wi), where N = {1, . . . , n}, we have A − B = 0 since ‖w‖1 = ‖w‖1
and w,w ∈ Rn≥0. Thus, ‖w − w‖1 = 2A and ‖w − w‖∞ ≤ max{A,B} = A. 
3. INEQUALITIES BETWEEN WEIGHTS AND POWER INDICES
We are interested in upper bounds for the distance between the relative weights w
of a weighted game [q;w] (with n voters) and the corresponding power distribution
ϕ([q;w]). As argued in the previous subsection, we should limit our considerations on
distance functions induced by a norm ‖ · ‖. While any two norms are equivalent for a
fixed dimension n, the corresponding constants can of course depend on n. So, we have
to explicitly state which norms we want to use. Here, we restrict ourselves onto the
norms ‖ · ‖1 and ‖ · ‖∞, which have nice mathematical and algorithmic properties. Note
that ‖x‖∞ ≤ ‖x‖2 ≤ ‖x‖1, so that we capture two kinds of extreme positions. Knowing
w, [q;w], ϕ(·) and ‖ · ‖ of course uniquely determines ‖w − ϕ ([q;w]) ‖. We thus aim
at deriving upper bounds only invoking few invariants of a given representation (q;w)
and the corresponding weighted game [q;w]. In Subsection 3.1 we briefly describe
the invariants considered in this paper and discuss possible alternatives. The aim of
Subsection 3.2 is to derive lower bounds for the distance between relative weights and
power in the worst case. Upper bounds are treated in Subsection 3.3.
3.1. Invariants of weighted games and their representations. We consider a weight-
ed game with normalized representation (q;w), i.e., w ∈ Rn≥0 with ‖w‖1 = 1. Useful
and easy invariants are the number of voters n, the quota q ∈ (0, 1], and the maximum
weight maxiwi = ‖w‖∞.2 However, also more sophisticated invariants of weight vec-
tors have been studied in applications. The so-called Laakso-Taagepera index a.k.a.
Herfindahl-Hirschman index, c.f. [27], is used in Industrial Organization to measure the
concentration of firms in a market, see, e.g., [6].
2 For an arbitrary representation (q;w) we consider the normalized quota q/
∑n
i=1 wi and the normal-
ized relative weight max{wi/
∑n
j=1 wj | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}.
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Definition 3.1. For w ∈ Rn≥0 with w 6= 0 the Laakso-Taagepera index is given by
L(w) =
(
n∑
i=1
wi
)2
/
n∑
i=1
w2i .
In general we have 1 ≤ L(w) ≤ n. If the weight vector w is normalized, then
the formula simplifies to L(w) = 1/
∑n
i=1 w
2
i . Under the name “effective number of
parties” the index is widely used in political science to measure party fragmentation,
see, e.g., [26]. We observe the following relations between the maximum relative weight
∆ = ∆(w) and the Laakso-Taagepera index L(w):
Lemma 3.2. For w ∈ Rn≥0 with ‖w‖1 = 1, we have
1
∆
≤ 1
∆ (1− α(1− α)∆) ≤ L(w) ≤
1
∆2 + (1−∆)
2
n−1
≤ 1
∆2
for n ≥ 2, where α := 1
∆
− ⌊ 1
∆
⌋ ∈ [0, 1). If n = 1, then ∆ = L(w) = 1.
PROOF. Optimize
n∑
i=1
w2i with respect to the constraintsw ∈ Rn, ‖w‖1 = 1, and ∆(w) =
∆, see Section A for the technical details. 
So, any lower or upper bound involving L(w) can be replaced by a bound involving
∆ instead. Since ∆ has nicer analytical properties and requires less information on w,
we stick to ∆ in the following. We remark that there are similar inequalities for other
indices measuring market concentration.
In the context of the study of limit theorems for power distributions of weighted
games the Laakso-Taagepera index was suggested in [30]. However, the limit behavior
of L(w) is in one-to-one correspondence to the limit behavior of 1/∆(w):
Corollary 3.3. Let (wm)m∈N be a sequence of vectors with non-negative entries and
‖wm‖1 = 1. (To be more precise, wm ∈ Rnm≥0 for some nm ∈ N>0.) Then, we have
lim
m→∞
∆(wm) = 0 ⇐⇒ lim
m→∞
L(wm) =∞.
We leave the study of other possible invariants of weighted games and their represen-
tations for future research. Ideas for other invariants may, e.g., be smallest weight of
non-null voters or moments from statistics.
3.2. Lower bounds for the worst case approximation. In order to study the question
which set of invariants permits a meaningful upper bound on the distance between rela-
tive weights and power, we consider constructions meeting the prescribed invariants to
obtain lower bounds on the worst case approximation.
Since a large number of power indices is introduced in the literature and this stream
does not seem to dry out, it would be very desirable to have approximation statements
which hold for large classes of power indices. With no assumption other than power
being a function of the weighted game itself rather than its representation we observe:
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Lemma 3.4. Let n ∈ N>0, q, q ∈ (0, 1], w,w ∈ Rn≥0 with ‖w‖1 = ‖w‖1 = 1 and
[q;w] = [q;w], ‖ · ‖ be an arbitrary norm on Rn and ϕ be a power index, then we have
max {‖w − ϕ ([q;w])‖ , ‖w − ϕ ([q;w])‖} ≥ ‖w − w‖
2
.
PROOF. Using the triangle inequality yields ‖w − ϕ ([q;w])‖ + ‖w − ϕ ([q;w])‖ ≥
‖w − w‖ from which we can conclude the stated inequality. 
So, instead of lower bounds for the distance between relative weights and power,
we will consider lower bounds for the maximum distance between two relative weight
vectors of the same weighted game being compatible with the considered invariants.
The general lower bound of Lemma 3.4 will now be used to show that controlling the
quota and the number of voters cannot yield reasonable limit results, i.e., there exist
examples such that the distance between power and relative weights is lower bounded
by a positive constant not depending on the number of voters.
Lemma 3.5. For each q ∈ (0, 1] there exists a weighted game v = [q;w] = [q;w] with
n ≥ 2 voters, where w,w ∈ Rn≥0, and ‖w‖1 = ‖w‖1 = 1, such that ‖w−w‖∞ ≥ 13 and
‖w − w‖1 ≥ 23 .
PROOF. We give general constructions for different ranges of q:
• 2
3
< q ≤ 1: w = (2
3
, 1
3
, 0, . . . , 0
)
, w =
(
1
3
, 2
3
, 0, . . . , 0
)
;
• 1
3
< q ≤ 2
3
: w =
(
2
3
, 1
3
, 0, . . . , 0
)
, w = (1, 0, . . . , 0);
• 0 < q ≤ 1
3
: w =
(
2
3
, 1
3
, 0, . . . , 0
)
, w =
(
1
3
, 2
3
, 0, . . . , 0
)
.

So, if we just know that the number of voters tends to infinity and the quotas are fixed
to some arbitrary number in (0, 1] or some arbitrary subinterval of (0, 1], then no general
limit result is possible. For a single weighted game we can state a constant number as
a lower bound for the distance between relative weights and power independent of the
invariants q and n, both in the distances induced by the ‖ · ‖1- and the ‖ · ‖∞-norm,
respectively.
Similarly, it is not sufficient to require that the maximum relative weight ∆ tends to
zero, which is equivalent to L(w) → ∞ and implies that the number of voters grows
without bounds. In terms of a single weighted game, we construct a weighted repre-
sentation consisting of any number of voters that is sufficiently large and exactly meets
the chosen value of ∆. Then we construct another weighted representation of the same
weighted game whose distance to the first weight vector is lower bounded by a constant
in the distance induced by the ‖ · ‖1-norm.
Lemma 3.6. For each ∆ ∈ (0, 1) there exists a weighted game v = [q;w] = [q;w]
with n ≥ 4
3∆
+ 6 voters, where q ∈ (0, 1), w,w ∈ Rn≥0, ∆(w) = ∆(w) = ∆, and
‖w‖1 = ‖w‖1 = 1, such that ‖w − w‖1 ≥ 23 and ‖w − w‖∞ ≥ ∆/2.
PROOF. If ∆ ≥ 2
3
, we can consider a weighted game with two passers and n − 2 null
voters. One representation is given by q = 1 − ∆ and w = (∆, 1 − ∆, 0, . . . , 0). Of
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course we can swap the weights of the first two voters and obtain a second representation
given by quota q an weight vector w = (1 − ∆,∆, 0, . . . , 0). With this, we compute
‖w − w‖1 = 2 · (2∆− 1) ≥ 23 and ‖w − w‖∞ = 2∆− 1 ≥ ∆/2.
If 0 < ∆ < 2
3
, we define an integer a :=
⌊
2
3∆
⌋ ≥ 1 and consider a weighted game
with 2a passers and n − 2a null voters. One representation is given by q = ∆/2,
w2i−1 = ∆, w2i = ∆/2 for 1 ≤ i ≤ a, w2a+1 = w2a+3 = w2a+5 = 13 − a∆2 ≥ 0,
w2a+2 = w2a+4 = w2a+6 = 0, and wi = 0 for all 2a + 7 ≤ i ≤ n. By assumption
we have n ≥ 2a + 6 and the first 2a voters are obviously passers. By checking 0 ≤
1
3
− a∆
2
< ∆
2
we conclude that the remaining voters are null voters and have a non-
negative weight. By construction, the weights of the n voters sum up to one. Changing
the weights of player 2i − 1 and player 2i for 1 ≤ i ≤ a does not change the game so
that we obtain a second representation with quota q and weights w2i = ∆, w2i−1 = ∆/2
for 1 ≤ i ≤ a, w2a+2 = w2a+4 = w2a+6 = 13 − a∆2 ≥ 0, w2a+1 = w2a+3 = w2a+4 =
w2a+1 = w2a+2 = w2a+3 = 0, and wi = 0 for all 2a + 7 ≤ i ≤ n. With this, we have
‖w − w‖1 = a∆ + 2− 3a∆ = 2(1− a∆) ≥ 23 and ‖w − w‖∞ = ∆/2. 
For each w,w ∈ Rn with ∆(w) = ∆(w), we obviously have ‖w − w‖∞ ≤ ∆(w).
So, a constant lower bound for the | · ‖∞-norm can only exist if we slightly weaken the
assumptions.
Lemma 3.7. For ∆ ∈ (0, 1] there exists a weighted game v = [q;w] = [q;w] with
n ≥ 1
∆
+ 1 ≥ 2, q, q ∈ (0, 1), w,w ∈ Rn≥0, ∆(w) = ∆, and ‖w‖1 = ‖w‖1 = 1 such
that ‖w − w‖∞ ≥ 13 .
PROOF. If 1 ≥ ∆ ≥ 2
3
we can apply Lemma 3.6 or the subsequent example, so that
we assume ∆ < 2
3
in the following. With a := b1/∆c we set wi = ∆ for 1 ≤ i ≤ a,
wa+1 = 1 − a∆, and wi = 0 for a + 2 ≤ i ≤ n. Note that a ≥ 1, 0 ≤ wa+1 < ∆,
∆(w) = ∆, ‖w‖1 = 1, and a+ 1 ≤ 1∆ + 1.
If wa+1 > 0 we set q = wa+1, so that all voters 1 ≤ i ≤ a + 1 are passers and
the remaining voters are null voters. Another representation of the same is given by
q = ε/a, w1 = 1 − ε, wi = ε/a for 2 ≤ i ≤ a + 1, and wi = 0 for a + 2 ≤ i ≤ n,
where ε = 2/3 −∆ > 0. By construction all weights wi are non-negative, ‖w‖1 = 1,
and ‖w − w‖∞ ≥ 1−∆− ε ≥ 13 .
If wa+1 = 0 we set q = ∆, so that all voters 1 ≤ i ≤ a are passers and the remaining
voters are null voters. Note that wa+1 = 1− a∆ = 0 implies a ≥ 2. Another represen-
tation of the same game is given by q = ε/(a − 1). w1 = 1 − ε, wi = ε/(a − 1) for
2 ≤ i ≤ a, and wi = 0 for a+ 1 ≤ i ≤ n, where ε = 2/3−∆ > 0. By construction all
weights wi are non-negative, ‖w‖1 = 1, and ‖w − w‖∞ ≥ 1−∆− ε ≥ 13 . 
Combining Lemma 3.4 with lemmas 3.5 and 3.6 gives:
Proposition 3.8. Let ϕ be a power index, i.e., a mapping from the set of weighted games
(on n voters) into Rn≥0.
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(i) For each q ∈ (0, 1] and each integer n ≥ 2 there exists a weighted game v with n
voters that permits a representation [q;w] = v, where w ∈ Rn≥0 and ‖w‖1 = 1,
such that ‖w − ϕ([q;w])‖1 ≥ 13 and ‖w − ϕ([q;w])‖∞ ≥ 16 .
(ii) For each ∆ ∈ (0, 1) and each integer n ≥ 4
3∆
+ 6 there exists a weighted
game v with n voters that permits a representation [q;w] = v, where q ∈ (0, 1],
w ∈ Rn≥0, ‖w‖1 = 1, and ∆(w) = ∆, such that ‖w − ϕ([q;w])‖1 ≥ 13 , and‖w − ϕ([q;w])‖∞ ≥ ∆/4.
So, we have shown that controlling either the relative quota or the maximum relative
weight is not sufficient to obtain reasonable upper bounds for the distance between
relative weights and power if the number of voters gets large. However, it is sufficient
to control the quota q and the maximum relative weight ∆ for some power indices
as we will see in the next subsection. (If ∆ tends to zero, then the number of voters
automatically tends to∞ since ∆ ≥ 1
n
. Due to Lemma 3.2 it would also be sufficient to
control the quota and the Laakso-Taagepera index.)
In some applications only weighted games with a quota of at least one half are consid-
ered which clashes with some of our constructions in the proofs of the previous lemmas.
However, by considering the dual of a given weighted game we can turn a quota below
one half to a quota above one half. So, instead of small quotas we get large quotas.
3.3. Upper bounds for the distance between weights and power. We start with a
rather general upper bound for all positive and efficient power indices ϕ satisfying∑
i∈S ϕi([q;w)] ≥ q for every winning coalition S. This directly implies an upper
bound for the nucleolus.
Lemma 3.9. Let w ∈ Rn≥0 with ‖w‖1 = 1 for an integer n ∈ N>0 and 0 < q < 1. For
each x ∈ Rn≥0 with ‖x‖1 = 1 and x(S) =
∑
s∈S xs ≥ q for every winning coalition S
of [q;w], we have ‖w − x‖1 ≤ 2∆min{q+∆,1−q} ≤ 2∆min{q,1−q} , where ∆ = ∆(w).
PROOF. Consider a winning coalition T such that x(T ) is minimal and invoke x(T ) ≥ q,
see Section A for the technical details. 
Corollary 3.10. Let w ∈ Rn≥0 with ‖w‖1 = 1 for an integer n ∈ N>0 and 0 < q < 1.
For each element x of the nucleus3, which contains the nucleolus, of [q;w], we have
‖w − x‖1 ≤ 2∆min{q+∆,1−q} ≤ 2∆min{q,1−q} , where ∆ = ∆(w).
PROOF. We have 1 − x(S) ≤ E1(x) for every winning coalition S of [q;w], where
E1(x) is the maximum excess. Since 1−w(S) ≤ 1−q for every winning coalition S of
[q;w], we have 1− x(S) ≤ 1− q as the maximum excess is minimized for all elements
of the nucleus. 
3The nucleus of a weighted game [q;w] is the set of all x ∈ Rn≥0 with ‖x‖1 = 1 that minimize the
maximum excess E1(x) = maxS⊆N v(S) − x(S). If [q;w] contains passers, then those x may not be
individually rational, i.e., xi ≥ v({i}) is violated. This case is excluded by some authors.
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Lemma 3.9 and Corollary 3.10 generalize [25, Lemma 1] by weakening the assump-
tions. From Lemma 2.2 we can directly conclude similar bounds for the ‖ ·‖∞-distance.
Some power indices ϕ have the property that ϕ([q;w]) is a feasible weight vector
for a suitable quota q′, i.e., [q;w] = [q′;ϕ([q;w])]. Examples are the minimum sum
representation index, see [10], or power indices based on averaged representations from
[16, 17]. For the Penrose-Banzhaf index, the subclass of spherically separable simple
games has this property, see [14]. Thus, it is appealing to study upper bounds for the
‖ · ‖1-distance between two relative weight vectors of the same weighted game since
these imply upper bounds for the distance between power and weights given that the
power vector can be completed to a representation. From Lemma 3.9 we can directly
conclude the following two implications:
Corollary 3.11. Let w,w ∈ Rn≥0 with ‖w‖1 = ‖w‖1 = 1 for an integer n ∈ N>0 and
0 < q ≤ q < 1. If [q;w] = [q;w] and ∆ = ∆(w), then we have ‖w−w‖1 ≤ 2∆min{q,1−q} .
Corollary 3.12. Let w,w ∈ Rn≥0 with ‖w‖1 = ‖w‖1 = 1 for an integer n ∈ N>0 and
0 < q, q < 1. If [q;w] = [q;w], then we have
‖w−w‖1 ≤ max
{
2∆(w)
min{q, 1− q} ,
2∆(w)
min{q, 1− q}
}
≤ 2∆(w)
min{q, 1− q}+
2∆(w)
min{q, 1− q} .
Unfortunately, those corollaries do not allow us to derive a bound on ‖w − w‖1
which only depends on q and ∆(w). However, we can obtain the following analog
of Lemma 3.9 for losing instead of winning coalitions.
Lemma 3.13. Let w ∈ Rn≥0 with ‖w‖1 = 1, ∆ = ∆(w), and 0 < q < 1. For each
x ∈ Rn≥0 with ‖x‖1 = 1 and x(S) =
∑
s∈S xs ≤ q for every losing coalition S of
[q;w], we have ‖w − x‖1 ≤ 4∆min{q,1−q} . Moreover, if q > ∆(w), then ‖w − x‖1 ≤
2∆
min{q−∆,1−q+∆} ≤ 2∆min{q−∆,1−q} .
PROOF. Consider a losing coalition T such that x(T ) is maximal and invoke x(T ) ≤ q.
Section A provides technical details. 
Intuitively, the inconspicuous condition ∆(w) < q is equivalent to the property that
[q;w] does not contain passers.
Corollary 3.14. Let w,w ∈ Rn≥0 with ‖w‖1 = ‖w‖1 = 1, ∆ = ∆(w), and 0 < q, q < 1.
If [q;w] = [q;w], then we have ‖w − w‖1 ≤ 4∆min{q,1−q} . Moreover, if additionally [q;w]
does not contain any passer, then we have ‖w − w‖1 ≤
min
{
2∆
min{q −∆, 1− q} ,
2∆(w)
min{q −∆(w), 1− q}
}
≤ 2∆
min{q −∆, 1− q} .
PROOF. If q ≥ q, then w(S) ≥ q ≥ q for every winning coalition S of [q;w]. Here, we
can apply Lemma 3.9. Otherwise we have w(T ) < q < q for every losing coalition T
of [q;w] and Lemma 3.13 applies. For the second bound note that we can interchange
the roles of (q, w) and (q, w) and take the tighter of the two resulting bounds. 
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From Corollary 3.14 we can deduce the following:
Theorem 3.15. Let w ∈ Rn≥0 with ‖w‖1 = 1 and 0 < q < 1. If a power index ϕ permits
the existence of a quota q′ ∈ (0, 1) such that [q′;ϕ([q;w])] = [q;w], i.e., that the power
vector of the given weighted game can be completed to a representation of the same
game, then
‖w − ϕ([q;w])‖1 ≤ 4∆(w)
min{q, 1− q} .
As mentioned before, representation compatibility of ϕ for [q;w] is automatically
satisfied for the minimum sum representation index or one of the power indices based
on averaged representations for all weighted games and for the Penrose-Banzhaf index
for all spherically separable simple games. The theorem also applies to the bargaining
model for weighted games analyzed in [36], cf. [34].
We remark that Lemma 3.9 and Lemma 3.13 are also valid for roughly weighted
games, where coalitions with a weight sum being equal to q may also be losing. So,
one might ask the same question for α-roughly weighted games, see [11, 13], where
coalitions with weight sum below q are losing and coalitions with weight sum above αq
are winning.
In the previous subsection we have argued that reasonable upper bounds on the dis-
tance between weights and power are impossible if only the relative quota or the max-
imum relative weight is taken into account. If both invariants are known, we have pre-
sented corresponding upper bounds for some power indices. So far we know that both
invariants have to be involved in every upper bound somehow, but the tightest possible
functional correlation is unknown. To that end, we provide the following lower bound
matching the shape of the upper bound.
Lemma 3.16. For each 0 < qˆ < 1, 0 < ∆ < 1 and each sufficiently large integer n
there exist weight vectors w,w ∈ Rn≥0 with ‖w‖1 = ‖w‖1 = 1, ∆(w) = ∆ and a quota
0 < q < 1 with [qˆ;w] = [q;w] such that ‖w − w‖1 ≥ c · min
{
2, ∆
min{qˆ,1−qˆ}
}
, where
∆ = ∆(w) and c = 1
5
.
PROOF. A construction of a matching representation (q, w) is provided in Section A. 
Via Lemma 3.4 this can be turned into:
Theorem 3.17. Let ϕ be a power index, i.e., a mapping from the set of weighted games
(on n voters) into Rn≥0. For each weighted game v = [q;w], where ‖w‖1 = 1, there
exists a normalized representation (q;w) such that
‖w − ϕ(v)‖1 ≥ 1
10
·min
{
2,
∆(w)
min{q, 1− q}
}
.
So, the upper bounds of Lemma 3.9 and Corollary 3.14 are tight up to the involved
constant c.
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Shapley- Penrose- Public Deegan- Shift-
n Shubik Banzhaf Johnston Good Packel Shift DP
3 0.33333 0.20000 0.50000 0.33333 0.00000 0.33333 0.00000
4 0.50000 0.40000 0.75000 0.51429 0.30000 0.51429 0.50000
5 0.60000 0.57895 0.87500 0.70330 0.50000 0.80769 0.75000
6 0.66667 0.72222 1.00000 1.00000 0.71795 1.25763 1.24444
7 0.71429 0.82609 1.13710 1.43590 1.16923 1.60131 1.55556
8 0.75000 0.89552 1.29167 1.78649 1.49020 2.13108 2.08929
9 0.77778 0.98154 1.49796 2.01504 1.71429 2.53762 2.43750
TABLE 1. Necessary constant c for the approximation of the normalized
minimum sum integer representation.
In order to prove upper bounds similar to Theorem 3.15 for power indices that cannot
be completed to a representation in general, it suffices to consider an arbitrary weighted
representation for each weighted game, since we can use Corollary 3.14 and the triangle
inequality to transfer the result to any other weighted representation (while, of course,
the involved constant of the upper bound has to be increased). We can use that insight
also in the other direction, i.e., to numerically check whether such an upper bound for a
given power index might exist at all. Table 1 lists the maximum necessary constant c so
that ‖ϕ([q;w])−w‖1 ≤ c·maxi wimin{q,1−q} for each weighted game with n voters. As representa-
tion (q;w) we have chosen the normalization of a minimum sum integer representation,
see e.g. [20]. There are 993 061 482 weighted games with n = 9 voters, see [18]. The
exact numbers are unknown for n > 9. For the definitions of the considered power in-
dices, i.e., Shapley-Shubik, Penrose-Banzhaf, Johnston, Public Good, Deegan-Packel,
Shift and Shift-Deegan-Packel index, we refer, e.g., to [22]. Actually, we included all
power indices known to us, even the scarcely applied ones, that have no upper bound
implied by the previous results from this section.
The, admittedly, sparse and possibly biased data of Table 1 suggests that there may be
no result like Theorem 3.15 for the latter five power indices. Let us have a closer look
at the most commonly used power indices, i.e., the Shapley-Shubik and the Penrose-
Banzhaf index. For the Shapley-Shubik index the “worst case” examples in the setting
of Table 1 can be easily guessed.
Lemma 3.18. For n ≥ 3, v = [n− 1;n− 1,
n−1︷ ︸︸ ︷
1, . . . , 1], q = 1
2
, w =
(
1
2
, 1
2n−2 , . . . ,
1
2n−2
)
where v = [q;w] and ‖w‖1 = 1, we have ϕ(v) = 1n(n−1) · ((n− 1)2, 1, . . . , 1) and
‖ϕ(v)− w‖1 = n−2n for the Shapley-Shubik index ϕ.
PROOF. For a voter 2 ≤ i ≤ n we only need to consider the winning coalition S =
{2, . . . , n}, so that ϕi(v) = (n−2)!·1!n! = 1n(n−1) and ϕ1(v) = 1−
∑n
i=2 ϕi(v) =
n−1
n
. 
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We conjecture that Lemma 3.18 gives indeed the worst case scenario for the Shapley-
Shubik index. If true, this would imply ‖w − ϕ([q;w])‖1 ≤ 5∆(w)min{q,1−q} for the Shapley-
Shubik index and weighted games [q;w] in normalized representation.
For the Penrose-Banzhaf index the very same example leads to the power distribu-
tion 1
2n−1+n−2 · (2n−1 − 1, 1, . . . , 1), so that the corresponding constant c quickly tends
to 1. While this indeed gives the worst case example for n ≤ 8, things get worse for
larger n. To that end, let wi = 2 for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, wi = 1 for m + 1 ≤ i ≤ 2m, and
q = α · 3m, where m ≥ 1 and α ∈ (0, 1). If q(m) and w(n) denote the normalized
quota and weights, then the limit limm→∞ ‖ϕ([q(m);w(m)] − w(m)‖1 exists for the
Penrose-Banzhaf index ϕ. Note that q(m) = α. We have depicted the corresponding
limits for different values of q(m) = α in Figure 1 as dist, where the x-axis is la-
beled with 1000q = 1000α and the y-axis with the ‖ · ‖1-distance. We remark that
the function is symmetric to α = 1
2
and takes values between zero and 1
3
. As a close
approximation we have plotted the function f(x) =
∣∣x− 1
2
∣∣3 · 8
3
labeled as cmp. So,
the ‖ · ‖1-distance between relative weights and the corresponding power distribution
according to the Penrose-Banzhaf index converges to a constant while the maximum
relative weight ∆ tends to zero for a fixed relative quota. There are only two types of
voters with shares of 2
3
and 1
3
, respectively. This example shows that it is not possible
to derive a general PLT-type result for the Penrose-Banzhaf index if the relative quota
does not equal 1
2
. In that direction numerical simulations and analytical results can be
found in [5] and [33], respectively. For the other power indices from Table 1, besides
the Shapley-Shubik index, similar deviations occur for the same example.
FIGURE 1. Deviation between weights and the Penrose-Banzhaf index.
For q = 1
2
we are not aware of examples that would prevent an upper bound in
the form of Inequality (1). Another way to circumvent the suggested non-existence
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results is to restrict the class of weighted games to special subclasses like e.g. spherically
separable games for the Penrose-Banzhaf index. Another example is given by the rather
narrow class of unanimity or quota games which can be parameterized as [q; 1, . . . , 1]
for some integer 1 ≤ q ≤ n for n voters. Any symmetric and efficient power index
assigns a power of 1
n
to every voter, so that Theorem 3.15 can be applied.
4. IMPLICATIONS OF UPPER BOUNDS ON THE ‖ · ‖1-DISTANCE
Several results in the literature about limit results for the power distribution of weighted
voting games are not given in the form of Inequality (1). However, we will argue in this
subsection that several formulations can be concluded from a given upper bound in the
shape of Inequality (1).
If the ‖ · ‖1-distance between power and weights is small and the relative weight
sum of all voters sharing the same weight as voter i does not vanish, then the quotient
between power and relative weight for voter i has to be close to 1.
Lemma 4.1. Let w ∈ Rn≥0 with ‖w‖1 = 1, 0 < q < 1 and ϕ be a symmetric, efficient,
and positive power index. If ‖ϕ([q;w])− w‖1 ≤ ε, then
1− ε
2α
≤ ϕi([q;w])
wi
≤ 1 + ε
2α
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n withwi > 0, where α = w(S) > 0 and S := {1 ≤ j ≤ n : wi = wj}.
PROOF. Assuming ϕ([q;w])i
wi
> 1 + ε
2α
yields ϕ(S) − w(S) > ε/2 by summing over all
j ∈ S. Since ‖ϕ‖1 = ‖w‖1 = 1 and ϕ,w ∈ Rn≥0 we would have ‖w − ϕ‖1 > ε – a
contradiction. Assuming ϕ([q;w])i
wi
< 1 − ε
2α
yields w(S) − ϕ(S) > ε/2, which leads to
the same contradiction. 
Using the mass measure α is necessary since for each integer n ≥ 2 we may consider
the weighted game v consisting of n − 1 voters of weight 2 and one voter of weight 1.
Let ϕ be a symmetric and efficient power index that satisfies the null voter property and
w denote the corresponding relative weights. If the quota q is an odd integer, we have
ϕi(v) =
1
n
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, so that ‖ϕ(v)− w‖1 = n−1n · 22n−1 . If q is an even integer,
then the voter with weight 1 is a null voter and all other voters get ϕi(v) = 1n−1 due to
symmetry and efficiency. Here we have ‖ϕ(v)−w‖1 = 22n−1 . So ‖ϕ(v)−w‖1 tends to
zero as the number n of voters approaches infinity. However, the fraction ϕn(v)
wi
is either
0 or 2− 1
n
, i.e., rather far away from 1 for larger n.
Bounds for quotients between power and weights for two involved players can be
deduced from Lemma 4.1 via:
Lemma 4.2. If wi, wj, ϕi, ϕj ∈ R>0, εi, εj ∈ [0, 1) with 1 − εi ≤ ϕiwi ≤ 1 + εi and
1− εj ≤ ϕjwj ≤ 1 + εj , then
1− εi
1 + εj
≤ wi
wj
· ϕj
ϕi
≤ 1 + εi
1− εj and
∣∣∣∣ϕiwi − ϕjwj
∣∣∣∣ ≤ εi + εj.
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5. CONCLUSIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
If one is interested in upper bounds on the distance between relative weights and
a corresponding power distribution or limit results for sequences of weighted games,
given the relative quota and the maximum relative weight, Inequality (1) is the essential
answer. In Section 4 we have shown that related results can be generally concluded.
We have derived upper bounds in the form of Inequality (1) for the nucleolus and all
power indices based on weighted representations. Additionally, we have shown that for
an arbitrary power index it is not possible to obtain bounds of smaller magnitude. So,
future technical contributions might try to decrease the corresponding constants c as far
as possible. This contribution traded smaller constants for easier proofs. An important
open problem is whether the Shapley-Shubik index permits an upper bound of the form
of Inequality (1) or if the relation between q and ∆ has to be of a different shape. While
we showed that the monotonicity behavior of the Laakso-Taagepera index is the same
as for the inverse maximum relative weight, it might still be possible that the Laakso-
Taagepera index permits tighter bounds than the maximum relative weight. Moreover,
it seems worthwhile to study other invariants than those used here.
Regarding limit results we showed that the power distribution tends to the relative
weights under the ‖ · ‖1-distance for the nucleolus and power indices based on weighted
representations as long as the maximum relative weight tends to zero and the quotas
are not too skewed (i.e., bounded away from 0 and 1.) An analytical example with two
types of voters having non-vanishing weight shares illustrates that the ‖ · ‖1-distance
between the Penrose-Banzhaf power distribution and the relative weights tends to a
strictly positive number provided that the quota is a fixed number different from 1
2
. So,
for the Penrose-Banzhaf index power can not converge to weights provided the relative
quota is not pegged at one half. Besides the Shapley-Shubik index, for which the general
convergence was proven in [35], there seems to be no suitable candidate for another
such limit result among the classical power indices if the class of weighted games is not
restricted to suitable subclasses or only voters of specific types are considered in PLT
type results. Weakening the assumptions may allow more positive results.
For a weighted voting game [q;w] with many voters and a power index ϕ that permits
an upper bound like Inequality (1) the exact evaluation of ϕ([q;w]) may be replaced by
the computation of a normalized representation at the cost of an approximation error
that can be upper bounded by a concrete formula. Since Inequality (1) does not involve
the weights directly we may also apply this approximation in the case where some
weights are unknown. However, there is one major drawback. The presented results
give reasonable upper bounds for the approximation error only in those cases where the
maximum relative weight is comparatively small.
The case of the maximum relative weight going to zero one sometimes speaks of an
ocean of voters. In contrast, some voters, called islands, have a relatively large weight
and all others have an individual weight that is comparatively negligible. However, this
is not the case for the weight sum of all “small” voters. Limit results are available
for the Shapley-Shubik and the Penrose-Banzhaf index in the oceanic world with a
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finite number of atoms, see [8]. Our example on the ownership structure of a stock
corporation from the introduction may very likely belong to the oceanic world with a
few islands if large stockholders like e.g. hedge funds are involved. [30] reported that
limit results for both cases are commonly stated separately and that a unification is
needed. Lemma 3.2 and Corollary 3.3 show very transparently that the distinction using
the Laakso-Taagepera index is the very same as the distinction using the maximum
relative weight. Lemma 3.16 rather shows that it is impossible to derive meaningful
bounds in the oceanic case with islands given the premises underlying Inequality (1).
However, it seems reasonable to assume that the weights of the large voters are known
with high accuracy and that their number is relatively small. This would allow to make
use of combinatorial algorithms. The idea is to solve an auxiliary problem to compute
an approximation for the power distribution of the large voters. Suppose that for a set
N of voters we classify the voters into many small ones, collected in O, and a few large
ones, collected in N\O. Let w be the vector of relative weights, q be the relative quota,
α = w(O) the weight mass of the small voters, and x be an optimal solution of
min y subject to
y +
∑
i∈S
xi ≥ 1 ∀S ⊆ N\O : w(S) ≥ q
y +
q − w(S)
α
· β +
∑
i∈S
xi ≥ 1 ∀S ⊆ N\O : q − α ≤ w(S) < q
β +
∑
i∈N\O
xi = 1
xi ∈ R≥0 ∀i ∈ N\O
β ∈ R≥0
We claim that x?i = xi for i ∈ N\O and x?i = wi · βα is a good approximation for the
nucleolus x of [q;w]. More precisely, we conjecture that there exists a constant c ∈ R>0
such that
‖x− x?‖1 ≤ c∆O
min {|q − w(S)| : S ⊆ N\O} ,
where ∆O = max{wi : i ∈ O} is the maximum relative weight of a small voter.
The idea is to treat the small voters as a continuum and to determine a vector that
minimizes the maximum excess. This is the first step of the optimization problem for
the nucleolus. Preliminary results in the direction of this conjecture were obtained in
[12] quite some years ago. For suitable auxiliary problems for the Shapley-Shubik and
the Penrose-Banzhaf index we refer to [8]. The proposed direction of research of this
last paragraph departs from the topic of this paper, i.e., the approximation of power by
weights. However, it suggests to look for alternative approximations that can be applied
once the number of voters is large or partly unknown or uncertain in the oceanic case
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with islands where the obtained results on the deviation between power and weights are
impractical.
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APPENDIX A. DELAYED PROOFS
PROOF. (Lemma 3.2)
For n = 1, we have w1 = 1, ∆(w) = 1, α = 0, and L(w) = 1, so that we assume n ≥ 2
in the remaining part of the proof. For wi ≥ wj consider a := wi+wj2 and x := wi − a,
so that wi = a + x and wj = a − x. With this we have w2i + w2j = 2a2 + 2x2
and (wi + y)2 + (wj − y)2 = 2a2 + 2(x + y)2. Let us assume that w? minimizes∑n
i=1 w
2
i under the conditions w ∈ R≥0, ‖w‖1 = 1, and ∆(w) = ∆. (Since the
target function is continuous and the feasible set is compact and non-empty, a global
minimum indeed exists.) W.l.o.g. we assume w?1 = ∆. If there are indices 2 ≤ i, j ≤ n
with w?i > w
?
j , i.e., x > 0 in the above parameterization, then we may choose y = −x.
Setting w′i := w
?
i + y = a =
w?i +w
?
j
2
, w′j := w
?
j − y = a =
w?i +w
?
j
2
, and w′h := w
?
h
for all 1 ≤ h ≤ n with h /∈ {i, j}, we have w′ ∈ Rn≥0, ‖w′‖1 = 1, ∆(w′) = ∆, and∑n
h=1 (w
′
h)
2 =
∑n
h=1 (w
?
h)
2 − x2. Since this contradicts the minimality of w?, we have
w?i = w
?
j for all 2 ≤ i, j ≤ n, so that we conclude w?i = 1−∆n−1 for all 2 ≤ i ≤ n from
1 = ‖w?‖1 =
n∑
h=1
w?h. Thus, L(w) ≤ 1/
(
∆2 + (1−∆)
2
n−1
)
, which is tight. Since ∆ ≤ 1
and n ≥ 2, we have 1/
(
∆2 + (1−∆)
2
n−1
)
≤ 1
∆2
, which is tight if and only if ∆ = 1, i.e.,
n− 1 of the weights have to be equal to zero.
Now, let us assume that w maximizes
∑n
i=1w
2
i under the conditions w ∈ R≥0,
‖w‖1 = 1, and ∆(w) = ∆. (Due to the same reason a global maximum indeed ex-
ists.) Due to 1 = ‖w‖1 ≤ n∆ we have 0 < ∆ ≤ 1/n, where ∆ = 1/n implies wi = ∆
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. In that case we have L(w) = n and α = 0, so that the stated lower
bounds for L(w) are valid. In the remaining cases we assume ∆ > 1/n. If there would
exist two indices 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n with wi ≥ wj , wi < ∆, and wj > 0, we may strictly in-
crease the target function by moving weight from wj to wi (this corresponds to choosing
y > 0), by an amount small enough to still satisfy the constraints wi ≤ ∆ and wj ≥ 0.
Since ∆ > 0, we can set a := b1/∆c ≥ 0 with a ≤ n − 1 due to ∆ > 1/n. Thus, for
a maximum solution, we have exactly a weights that are equal to ∆, one weight that is
equal to 1 − a∆ ≥ 0 (which may indeed be equal to zero), and n − a − 1 weights that
are equal to zero. With this and a∆ = 1 − α∆ we have ∑ni=1w2i = a∆2(1 − a∆)2 =
∆ − α∆2 + α2∆2 = ∆(1 − α∆ + α2∆) = ∆ (1− α(1− α)∆) ≤ ∆. Here, the latter
inequality is tight if and only if α = 0, i.e., 1/∆ ∈ N. 
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PROOF. (Lemma 3.9)
We set N = {1, . . . , n}, w(U) = ∑u∈U wu and x(U) = ∑u∈U xu for each U ⊆ N .
Let S+ = {i ∈ N | xi > wi} and S− = {i ∈ N | xi ≤ wi}, i.e., S+ and S− partition
the set N of players. We have w(S+) < 1 since w(S+) < x(S+) ≤ x(N) = 1, so that
w(S−) > 0. Define 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 by x(S−) = (1− δ)w(S−). We have
x(S+) = 1− x(S−) = w(S+) + w(S−)− (1− δ)w(S−) = w(S+) + δw(S−) (2)
and
‖w − x‖1 =
(
x(S+)− w(S+))+ (w(S−)− x(S−)) = 2δw(S−). (3)
Generate a set T by starting at T = ∅ and successively add a remaining player i in
N\T with minimal xi/wi, where all players j with wj = 0 are the worst ones. Stop if
w(T ) ≥ q. By construction T is a winning coalition of [q;w] with w(T ) < q+ ∆, since
the generating process did not stop earlier and wj ≤ ∆(w) for all j ∈ N .
If w(S−) ≥ q, we have T ⊆ S− and x(T )/w(T ) ≤ x(S−)/w(S−) = 1 − δ. Multi-
plying by w(T ) and using w(T ) < q + ∆ yields
x(T ) ≤ (1− δ)w(T ) < (1− δ)(q + ∆) = (1− δ)q + (1− δ)∆. (4)
Since x(T ) ≥ q, as T is a winning coalition, we conclude δ < ∆/(q + ∆). Using this
and w(S−) < 1 in Equation (3) yields
‖w − x‖1 < 2∆
q + ∆
<
2∆
q
. (5)
If w(S−) < q, we have S− ⊆ T , x(T ) = x(S−) + x(T\S−), w(T\S−) > 0, and
w(S+) > 0. Since T\S− ⊆ S+, x(T\S−)/w(T\S−) ≤ x(S+)/w(S+), so that
x(T ) = x(S−) + x(T\S−) ≤ (1− δ)w(S−) + x(S
+)
w(S+)
· (w(T )− w(S−))
≤ (1− δ)w(S−) + x(S
+)
w(S+)
· (q + ∆− w(S−))
= q +
x(S+)∆− (1− q)δw(S−)
w(S+)
≤ q + ∆− (1− q)δw(S
−)
w(S+)
.
Since x(T ) ≥ q, we conclude (1− q)δw(S−) ≤ ∆, so that ‖w − x‖1 ≤ 2∆1−q . 
PROOF. (Lemma 3.13)
If q ≤ 2∆, then 4∆
min{q,1−q} ≥ 4∆q ≥ 2 ≥ ‖x− w‖1, so that we can assume q > ∆.
Using the notation from the proof of Lemma 3.9, we have x(S+) = w(S+)+δw(S−)
and ‖w − x‖1 = 2δw(S−).
Generate T by starting at T = ∅ and successively add a remaining player i in N\T
with maximal xi/wi, where all players j with wj = 0 are taken in the first rounds,
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as long as w(T ) + wi < q. By construction T is a losing coalition of [q;w] with
q −∆ ≤ w(T ) < q, since the generating process did not stop earlier.
If w(S+) ≥ q, we have T ⊆ S+ and x(T )/w(T ) ≥ x(S+)/w(S+) = 1 + δw(S−)
w(S+)
≥
1 + δw(S−). Multiplying by w(T ) and using w(T ) ≥ q −∆ yields
x(T ) ≥ (1 + δw(S−))w(T ) ≥ (1 + δw(S−)) (q −∆) = (q −∆) + δw(S−)(q −∆).
Since x(T ) ≤ q, as T is a losing coalition, we conclude δw(S−) ≤ ∆/(q −∆), so that
‖w − x‖1 < 2∆q−∆ .
If w(S+) < q, we have S+ ⊆ T , x(T ) = x(S+) + x(T\S+), w(T\S+) > 0, and
w(S−) > 0. Since T\S+ ⊆ S−, x(T\S+)/w(T\S+) ≥ x(S−)/w(S−), so that
x(T ) = x(S+) + x(T\S+) ≥ w(S+) + δw(S−) + x(S
−)
w(S−)
· (w(T )− w(S+))
≥ w(S+) + δw(S−) + (1− δ) · (q −∆− w(S+))
= δw(S−) + q −∆− δq + δ∆ + δw(S+) = q −∆ + δ(1− q + ∆).
Since x(T ) ≤ q, δ ≤ ∆
1−q+∆ , so that ‖w − x‖1 ≤ 2∆1−q+∆ due to w(S−) ≤ 1.
So, for q > ∆ we have ‖w−x‖1 ≤ 2∆min{q−∆,1−q+∆} ≤ 2∆min{q−∆,1−q} . In order to show
‖w − x‖1 ≤ 4∆min{q,1−q} it remains to consider the case q ≤ 1 − q. For q > 2∆, see the
start of the proof, we have ‖w − x‖1 ≤ 2∆min{q−∆,1−q} ≤ 2∆q−∆ ≤ 4∆q ≤ 4∆min{q,1−q} . 
In order to prove Lemma 3.16, we need two preparing lemmas.
Lemma A.1. For each 0 < q ≤ ∆ ≤ 1, each n ∈ N, and each 0 < ε < min{∆, 1/2}
with n ≥ max{3, 1/∆} there exist w,w ∈ Rn≥0 with ‖w‖1 = ‖w‖1 = 1, ∆(w) = ∆,
and 0 < q < 1 with [q;w] = [q;w], such that ‖w−w‖1 ≥ 1−2ε and ‖w−w‖∞ ≥ 12−ε.
PROOF. We set a :=
⌊
1
∆
⌋ ∈ N≥1, so that 12∆ < a ≤ 1∆ .
If 1−a∆ ≥ q, we setwi = ∆ for 1 ≤ i ≤ a,wa+1 = 1−a∆,wi = 0 for a+2 ≤ i ≤ n,
wa+1 = 1− ε, wi = ε/a for 1 ≤ i ≤ a, wi = 0 for a + 2 ≤ i ≤ n, and q = ε/a. Here,
we have ‖w − w‖1 = 2 · (a∆− ε) > 1− 2ε and ‖w − w‖∞ = a∆− ε ≥ 12 − ε.
If 1− a∆ < q and a ≥ 2, then we set wi = ∆ for 1 ≤ i ≤ a, wa+1 = 1− a∆, wi = 0
for a+ 2 ≤ i ≤ n, w1 = 1− ε, wi = εa−1 for 2 ≤ i ≤ a, wi = 0 for a+ 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and
q = ε
a−1 . With this, we have ‖w−w‖1 = 1− ε−∆ + (a− 1) ·
(
∆− ε
a−1
)
+ 1− a∆ =
1 + (a− 2)∆− 2ε + (1− a∆) ≥ 1− 2ε and ‖w − w‖∞ ≥ 1−∆− ε ≥ 12 − ε since
a ≥ 2, so that ∆ ≤ 1
2
.
If a = 1 and 1 − a∆ = 1 − ∆ < q, then we have 1
2
< ∆ ≤ 1 and we set w1 = ∆,
w2 = 1 − ∆, wi = 0 for 3 ≤ i ≤ n, w1 = 12 + ε, w2 = 0, w3 = 12 − ε, wi = 0 for
4 ≤ i ≤ n, and q = 1
2
. We have ‖w − w‖1 ≥ 1− 2ε and ‖w − w‖∞ ≥ 12 − ε. 
Lemma A.2. Let 0 < ε < 1
2
, 0 < q < 1, b ∈ N≥1, qb+1 ≤ ∆ < qb , and n ∈ N with
n ≥ 1
∆
+ 1. Then, there exist w,w ∈ Rn≥0 with ‖w‖1 = ‖w‖1 = 1, ∆(w) = ∆, and
0 < q < 1 with [q;w] = [q;w], ‖w−w‖1 > 29 ·∆q −ε, and ‖w−w‖∞ > ∆3(∆+1) ·∆q −2∆ε.
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PROOF. We set a :=
⌊
1
∆
⌋ ∈ N≥1, so that 12∆ < a ≤ 1∆ . Consider wi = ∆ for 1 ≤ i ≤ a,
0 ≤ wa+1 = 1− a∆ < ∆, and wi = 0 for a+ 2 ≤ i ≤ n. Observe 1b > ∆q .
If b∆ + 1 − a∆ < q we set κ := a and κ := a + 1 otherwise. So, the voters
κ + 1 ≤ i ≤ n are null voters and the other voters are pairwise equivalent. We have
κ ≥ 2 since κ = 1 implies a = 1 and ∆ > 1
2
, so that b = 1 and b∆ + 1− a∆ = 1 ≥ q.
Additionally, we have ∆
∆+1
≤ 1
κ
< 2∆. (The right hand side may be decreased to 3
2
∆.)
If κ ≡ 0 (mod 2), then we set wi = 2κ · b+12b+1 − εκ for 1 ≤ i ≤ κ/2, wi = 2κ · b2b+1 + εκ
for κ/2 + 1 ≤ i ≤ κ, wi = 0 for κ + 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and q = 2κ · b
2+b
2b+1
. With this, we
have [q;w] = [q;w], ‖w‖1 = 1, ‖w − w‖1 ≥ 12b+1 − ε > 13 · ∆q − ε, and ‖w − w‖∞ ≥
1
κ(2b+1)
− ε
κ
> ∆
3(∆+1)
· ∆
q
− 2∆ε. If instead κ ≡ 1 (mod 2), then we have κ ≥ 3. In
this case we set wi = 2κ · b+12b+1 − εκ for 1 ≤ i ≤ (κ − 1)/2, wi = 2κ · b2b+1 + εκ for
(κ+ 1)/2 ≤ i ≤ κ− 1, wκ = 1κ , wi = 0 for κ+ 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and q = 2κ · b
2+b
2b+1
. With this,
we have [q;w] = [q;w], ‖w‖1 = 1, ‖w − w‖1 ≥ 12b+1 ·
(
1− 1
κ
) − ε > 2
9
· ∆
q
− ε, and
‖w − w‖∞ ≥ 1κ(2b+1) − εκ > ∆3(∆+1) · ∆q − 2∆ε. 
PROOF.(Lemma 3.16)
If qˆ ≤ 1 − qˆ, we can apply Lemma A.1 and Lemma A.2 with 0 < ε < min
{
1
10
, ∆
45qˆ
}
.
For the other case we remark that the dual of each weighted game [q;w] is given by [1−
q + ε˜;w] for each suitably small ε˜ > 0. So, we can apply Lemma A.1 and Lemma A.2
with q = 1− qˆ+ ε˜ and 0 < ε < 1
2
·min
{
1
10
, ∆
45q
}
=: κ. Certainly, we can choose ε˜ > 0
small enough to get∥∥∥∥min{2, ∆min{qˆ, 1− qˆ}
}
−min
{
2,
∆
min{q, 1− q}
}∥∥∥∥
1
< κ
and q ≤ 1− q. The stated result then follows from the triangle inequality. 
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